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Introduction
A highly contentious debate on nationalization
has moved to the top of the South African
policy agenda over the last eighteen months.
This debate has divided opinion at all levels of
society, as well as between large groups such
as the business community (largely opposed)
and organized labour (lately in favour) and
government (deeply divided to the highest
level). More recently, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development
recommended either nationalization of mines
or high taxation of extractive industries in
countries where such industries are an
important source of government revenue
(Maswanganyi, 2012). 
The issues at stake are of the first order of
importance for the future of the economy, and
include (at a high level of abstraction): (i) the
desirable role of the state in the South African
economy, (ii) the fiscal risks or benefits of
nationalization, (iii) the efficiency of the
mining sector in South Africa, and (iv) the
attractiveness of South Africa for local and
international investors. This paper analyses
each of these issues in turn. 
Economic development and the role of
the state
The transformation of modern society by what
has become known as the industrial revolution
is one of the most remarkable events in
history. Previously, and for almost all of
history, children lived the same lives as their
parents and grew richer, if at all and rarely, by
accumulating more inputs such as more land,
more cattle, and more labour. 
But this model has some obvious
limitations. An entire society cannot prosper
this way: there are too few farms to go around
and too few labourers, and the gains of some
seem to require losses by others. One cannot
imagine an entire society becoming six times
richer over the course of a century along this
path. And yet, that is what the average South
African experienced since 1870 (Maddison,
2003). In South Africa the division of these
gains has been notably unequal, with the rise
in income for the white population much more
than six times over the last century and that of
the black population much less. In addition to
being unequal, the local rise in prosperity has
been modest in comparison to that of other
industrializing countries. Average incomes in
the United Kingdom are seventeen times
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higher today than during the late eighteenth century, and in
Hong Kong the current generation is thirty times wealthier
than their grandparents. 
It is one of the great discoveries of modern economic
science that the tremendous rise in income witnessed since
the eve of the industrial revolution cannot be attributed to
using more land, or to a more intensive exploitation of
workers, or even to a rapid accumulation of capital (Solow,
1956; Easterly, 2001). Instead, the bulk of the long-term rise
in prosperity has been due to a rise in labour productivity; to
put it less formally, the rise in wealth is due to working
smarter, not harder or with more inputs. It is not easy to
work more productively and requires not just specialization
but also adaptability and the use of technological inventions
to improve the productivity of our labour. A society that
moves along this path of economic development is
transformed every generation, with children living lives very
different from those of their parents and grandparents.
Economic development is not in the first instance about rising
prosperity, it is about this process of transformation whereby
society moves along the path of ever-increasing productivity. 
But the process of economic development – which
transforms society with rising labour productivity due to
specialization and the appropriate use of technology and
capital – requires far more extensive co-operation than was
required in pre-industrial society. Workers in a developed
society depend on others for almost all of their needs and pay
for these goods and services with the compensation they earn
from their productive labour. It is clear that the process of
economic development requires not just transformation in the
lives of its individual members, but also a very extensive
degree of co-operation amongst them. In fact the co-operation
is much wider than local or national boundaries, forming the
basis of the modern concept of globalization. 
There is more than one way to organize the requisite co-
operation implied by the process of economic development.
At one extreme a government can try to arrange the entire
system of co-operation at the national level. The failure of
planning at this level is too well documented to list here and
the details are not relevant to the discussion at hand. It is
sufficient to note that allowing markets (instead of national
plans) to allocate resources was one of the five characteristics
shared by all 13 international economic growth success
stories of the post-war era (Commission on Growth and
Development, 2008). 
An economy where resources are largely allocated on
markets, that is to say on the initiative of the private sector,
is not without planning, but the planning in such an economy
is decentralized. Firms are amongst the most important areas
of planning in a market economy. These firms are at the
heart of the process of economic development described
above: much of the extensive co-operation that goes with
rising productivity occurs in and between firms.
Nationalization of firms in a developing county is therefore a
topic of critical importance as it affects a central part of the
process of economic development. 
Formally, nationalization is the compulsory acquisition by
the state of previously private firms. In constitutional states,
such as South Africa, there are legal guidelines that
determine the compensation government must pay in such
cases. Governments do not have an unimpeded choice
between ‘models’ of nationalization; instead the legal
framework within which they operate will determine the
available options. 
In the South African case, courts will determine the
appropriate compensation should the government nationalize
the mining sector. While the market value of the companies is
an important input in this process there are also factors to be
considered, notably:
1. The current use of the property
2. The history of the acquisition and use of the property
3. The market value of the property
4. The extent of direct state investment and subsidy in
the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of
the property
5. The purposes of the expropriation.
These factors might lower the amount of compensation
below the current market value of the relevant firms.
However, in the case of South African mines these consider-
ations would offer little scope for a large wedge between
compensation and market values. The reasons are as follows: 
1. South African mines are currently operated under
competitive conditions that drive them to attain consid-
erable efficiency. There is little incidence of mines
being held simply for speculative purposes
2. There is a separate legal process for people who were
forcibly removed from their land during Apartheid,
rendering this consideration of little relevance to the
nationalization of mines
3. There is little recent history of net subsidy or other
direct support to the mining sector
4. As argued below, the nationalization of mines will not
achieve any pressing social need, which renders that
consideration irrelevant as far as the calculation of
compensation is concerned
5. The South African government has signed a number of
international investment treaties by which government
has committed itself to full compensation in the event
of expropriation (Keeton and White, 2011). This is
relevant given the international composition of the
mining companies’ shareholders. For example, at the
end of 2010 year, nearly 53% of AngloGold Ashanti’s
shareholders were American, with roughly another
12% residing in the United Kingdom, and all these
would have to be compensated adequately for their
holdings
6. Finally, the shareholders of South African mines
include large public and private sector pension funds.
Any nationalization without compensation would pass
the cost of nationalization on to current and future
pensioners in all sectors of the economy. 
Nationalization of South African mines would represent a
major change in the role of the state in the local economy.
From the international experience there does not appear to be
any one level of state participation that yields predictably
better outcomes in terms of economic development
(Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). There are
certainly examples, especially from East Asia, where
government seems to have played a supportive role in the
rapid industrialization of countries like Korea and Singapore. 
But there are many more cases (especially in Latin America
and Africa) where government intervention held back
economic development (Tanzi, 2000; Easterly, 2001). 

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On this topic, a ‘Developmental State’, and the potential
for nationalization of the mines to promote that agenda is an
important part of the policy debate (ANCYL, 2010, for
example: paragraphs. 56, 59, 50, 70, and 85). The concept of
a ‘Developmental State’ is not an economic one and has been
imported to the sub-field of ‘Political Economy’ where non-
mainstream economists in particular use it. While it is not a
theory in the usual sense of that word, the concept typically
refers to a government that takes an active and leading role
in the economic development of a country. 
The East Asian success stories of the post-war period
provided the examples upon which this literature developed.
Whatever the ‘Developmental State’ means, though, it has
not been associated with a strong case for nationalization, or
even large state ownership of productive assets. Caldenty’s
(2009) summary of key characteristics of ‘Developmental
States’ included the following:
‘…this did not imply that it [Developmental State] made
heavy use of public ownership. Rather, the developmental
state tried to achieve its goals through a set of instruments
such as tax credits, breaks, subsidies, import controls, export
promotion, and targeted and direct financial and credit
policies instruments that belong to the realm of industrial,
trade, and financial policy.’ (Caldentey, 2009, p. 30). 
In the South African literature, proponents of the
Developmental State concept such as Turok (2010) have
emphasized the capacity for planning, the boldness to take
decisive policy action, and the democratic nature of the
‘Developmental State’, but not state ownership or national-
ization. And the Commission on Growth and Development,
which studied the common features of the 13 post-war
growth success stories, also warned against a preoccupation
with the size of government to the detriment of a discussion
about the effectiveness of government (Commission on
Growth and Development, 2008, p. 30). While the
Commission recommended that government take an active
part in the process of economic development, their advice was
not sympathetic to nationalization. Instead they
recommended a risk-management approach to policy-
making, which entails small policy adjustments that would
allow reversal if the results are undesirable (Commission on
Growth and Development, 2008, p. 31). Neither this result,
nor the ‘Developmental State’ literature, provides support for
the proposed nationalization of a large sector, such as mining
in South Africa‡. 
The absence of a strong justification for nationalization in
development economics demonstrated above is reflected in
the research agenda of economists more broadly over the last
twenty years. A generation ago, readers of the first edition of
the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics found an
insightful essay on nationalization by M.V. Posner (1987),
with cross-references to entries such as privatization, public
utility pricing, and socialism. Twenty years later, only an
essay on privatization by John Vickers (2008) appeared in
the massively expanded second edition of the New Palgrave,
with nationalization nowhere to be found. 
In South Africa, the policy debate followed a similar
trajectory (see, e.g., the account in Parsons, 1999), as policy-
makers proceeded with modest privatization during the mid-
1990s, having abandoned any further mention of possible
nationalization shortly after the political transition. 
To understand the debate that has since emerged in
South Africa one needs to look beyond the development
literature to a small body of literature that lists uncontro-
versial empirical results of broad generality (or stylized facts)
that are correlated with the succession of nationalizations
and privatizations in the post-war era, for example Chang 
et al. (2010) as well as authors who studied predictors of
nationalization as in Duncan (2006) for a range of major
minerals, and in Guriev, Kolotilin, and Sonin (2011) for oil.  
The following stylized facts drawn from this literature are
relevant to the local debate:  
1. Firstly, that nationalization occurs much more
frequently in the natural resources sector and in
utilities than in other sectors of the economy
2. Secondly, the occurrence of nationalization in the
resources sector is positively correlated with the real
price of these commodities: high commodity prices
have been associated with nationalization and low real
prices with privatization 
3. Private natural resource companies typically operate
with contracts that allow them to appropriate the
windfalls from commodity booms. And these windfall
profits encourage governments to consider national-
ization 
4. The integration of commodity markets internationally
brings about waves of nationalization – these are often
common to several countries at the same time.
Reading these four facts together gives us one possible
explanation for the local policy agenda and the observed rise
of nationalizations in the resources sector in Latin America in
recent years. This is not to deny that President Morales in
Bolivia and President Chavez in Venezuela have ideological
arguments for nationalization. That the ANC Youth League
also has an ideological agenda is clear; indeed they insist on
it (ANCYL, 2010, paragraph 25).The argument is, however,
that these ideological arguments find fertile ground when
commodity prices are higher, as they have been in recent
years, and the proposal then follows to nationalize those
companies that are perceived to enjoy unfair windfalls from a
commodity boom. 
Venezuela and Bolivia also share a fifth stylized fact
identified by Chang et al. (2010) and studied more systemat-
ically by Chua (1995), namely that endemic or rising
inequality is positively correlated with nationalization,
especially when the windfall gains from high resources prices
are perceived to be distributed unequally. 
These stylized facts can now be combined to understand
the local debate on nationalization: fiscal and distributional
claims have dominated the local discussion. The ANCYL plan
of May 2010 for nationalizing the mines, for example, argues
that ‘… the massive poverty challenges, unemployment and
unequal spatial development realities call for an urgent focus
on mineral resources’ (ANCYL, 2010,  par. 5). 
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In democracies, it is not enough to propose a policy, you
have to win electoral support for it. At this point, Duncan’s
(2006) demonstration that natural resource expropriation has
been more likely under democracies becomes relevant, and
Pint (1990) argued that the explanation for this lies therein
that the beneficiaries of nationalization are often concen-
trated, notably organized labour, while the costs are diffuse
and shared by current and future taxpayers. In a democratic
system, there is therefore a policy incentive to pursue nation-
alization, possibly sacrificing longer-run economic efficiency
for short-run political benefits. Unsurprisingly then, resource
nationalization has also been more common in countries
where the economy, and hence the tax base, are heavily
reliant on one or a few commodities (Kobrin, 1984; Minor,
1994). In these cases the beneficiaries of nationalization
might be more powerful politically. COSATU’s recent strong
support for nationalization is consistent with this theory. 
The explanation for the current debate in South Africa
offered in this paper is, therefore, as follows: the background
is the high level of income (and wealth) inequality in South
Africa (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). Add to this a few years of
higher commodity prices and the perception that the windfall
from these prices had been distributed such that inequality
was not lowered and may have increased, together with a
democratic political system where a populist leader can
mobilize support to serve a majoritarian goal, and we have
the South African debate on nationalization. 
Why ownership of corporations matters
The proponents of nationalization have not suggested that
the economy will reap great efficiency gains from nation-
alizing the mines (a traditional justification for national-
ization). Instead, and consistent with the influence of high
commodity prices, the supporting arguments have been
largely fiscal and ideological. 
The fiscal consequences of nationalization, therefore,
require a central place in the discussion of potential
consequences. It is ironic that both nationalization and
privatization can be motivated by the desire to improve public
finances. Proponents of privatization aim at lower
government debt with an associated lower interest burden on
the budget and, in the case of loss-making public enterprises,
a reduction in government expenditure. The argument is that
privatization frees up fiscal resources that will, subsequently,
be available to pursue government’s many other goals. 
Proponents of nationalization might also envisage greater
fiscal scope as a consequence of the policy. Their argument is
that the public sector’s revenue from nationalized firms might
exceed the tax revenue from private firms by a sufficient
margin to compensate for the costs of nationalization. In such
cases nationalization would increase fiscal resources. 
To judge the likelihood that nationalization will be a
fiscal burden or benefit, the following factors have to be
taken into account. 
1. Government’s cost of finance, since nationalization is
typically financed through government debt
2. The post-nationalization financial performance of the
firms, which is influenced by the goals and incentives
for the nationalized firms as well as the particular
industry at stake. 
Government’s cost finance is a determined by a number
of factors, including: the size of the existing stock of public
debt; recent changes in the public debt (surpluses and deficits
on the national budget); government’s track record,
especially on inflation; and the timely payment of debt. It
follows that governments with low debt and a credible record
in macroeconomic policy have a better chance to finance
nationalization at comparatively low interest rates, except in
cases where the cost of nationalization is itself large
compared with the existing debt stock. The proposal to
nationalize the mining sector in South Africa is an example of
the latter case, where the state has relatively little debt at the
moment and a credible fiscal and monetary track record, but
where the cost of nationalization will be so large (the details
are worked out later in this paper) as to impose a consid-
erable financial cost on government. 
The second factor that will determine the fiscal impact of
nationalization is the post-nationalization financial
performance of the relevant firms. The performance of a firm
is driven by many factors, not all of which will be affected by
the change in ownership implied by nationalization.
However, three important factors will be affected, they are:
the goals of the firm, the monitoring of corporate
performance, and the speed and intensity of feedback on
corporate behaviour. 
Starting with the firm’s goals: it is conceptually difficult
to define the goals of nationalized firms: in some ultimate
sense the public owns these firms, but in practice the public’s
goals are ill-defined and often contradictory. Is the public
interested in the highest net worth for the nationalized firms,
or perhaps alternatives such as distributional goals or
maximum employment? There are difficult trade-offs to be
managed here, for example between productivity and the
pursuit of equality (Sinnot et al., 2010), and the political
process is a highly imperfect mechanism for resolving such
conflicts. Public Choice§ authors have also identified the
many factors other than the public’s goals that are likely to
influence the decisions of managers at the nationalized firm,
including political considerations, the influence of lobbyists
and other special interests, the difficulty faced by the public
to write ‘complete contracts’ for the managers, and many
more (Schleiffer, 1998; Vickers, 2008). 
Not only are the goals different for public firms, but so
too are the mechanisms that monitor the behaviour of public
sector managers (Alchian, 1977). There is no possibility for
shareholder oversight with the intensity experienced on
financial markets, nor the ability to tie managerial incentives
to stock market performance, as an external assessment of
the company’s performance. Finally, there is no threat of
takeover in the public sector, a threat which disciplines
agents in a competitive private sector.

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§Public Choice is sub-field of Public Economics where the public sector
is studied using the tools of economic reasoning and the assumption
that public sector decision-makers have (i) goals of their own, and do not
simply pursue the goals of the general public and (ii) face budget
constraints and other limits to their action which can lead to sub-optimal
decision-making in the public sector. This literature has shown that
government failure is a possibility in the same way that market failure is a
possibility.  
Mentioning potential takeovers touches on the feedback
mechanism that encourages good behaviour and discourages
poor corporate decisions. Apart from sidestepping the threat
of takeovers, public sector managers are also not disciplined
by the threat of bankruptcy. The repeated bailouts of large
state-owned enterprises in South Africa in recent years are a
familiar demonstration of the ‘soft’ budget constraints that
frequently arise in these cases. 
To summarize these points, managers of a nationalized
firm face different and less clearly defined goals, are
monitored differently and possibly less effectively, and face
slower and weaker feedback when they act inconsistently
with the public’s goals. For these reasons, the nationalized
firms are likely to be less efficient from an economic
perspective and, hence, more likely to be a fiscal burden. This
likelihood rises the more competitive the private industry was
prior to nationalization. Nationalizing a competitive private
industry is likely to lead to less efficient public firms after
nationalization, and a greater likelihood that the nationalized
firms will be a financial burden for government. Although
this is a theoretical result, we will see its empirical echo in
the discussion of nationalization’s track record. 
The current turmoil in the European Union shows the
importance of the fiscal consequences of nationalization. It is
also important for the additional reason that government’s
budget is the main vehicle of redistribution in most countries,
including South Africa. Of course, it is possible for the
nationalized firms to pursue distributional goals on a limited
scale, by for example cross-subsidization schemes or softer
employment policies (Vickers, 2008). But the net financial
benefit of nationalizing the firms will affect government’s
ability to pursue all its goals, including the social assistance
by which government provides effective poverty relief and
redistribution to 15.2 million South Africans and which
accounts for almost 11% of the national budget (National
Treasury, 2011b, p. 38). 
Finally, Biais and Perotti (2002) have argued that the
choice between state or private ownership will not just affect
the outcomes of productive activity, but also shape society’s
political incentives. Widespread private ownership
encourages the public to support the institutions of private
property and contract rights that support specialization and
market co-operation, the two key features of rising prosperity
identified above. Conversely, state ownership creates
dependence on government and lowers the support for these
key market institutions. From this perspective, one of the
adverse long-term consequences of nationalization is that it
undermines the support for market institutions. 
The track record of nationalization
Controversy over the track record of nationalization is a
notable feature of the current South African debate; for
example, an ANC task group studied the outcomes of nation-
alization as well as different models of nationalization
internationally. The outcome of this research was published
early in 2012 (ANC Policy Institute, 2012) and was based on
the assumption that a careful enough study of particular
cases will reveal the contribution of nationalization to
subsequently favourable or unfavourable outcomes**. It is an
assumption that is very widely held, but leaves the analysis
with two related and serious shortcomings. The first problem
is that these cases studies cannot isolate the particular effect
of the change in public ownership from the many other
changes that are necessarily occurring in any actual historical
case. From this follows the second problem inherent to the
case study methodology, i.e. the inability to articulate a
counter-factual (or benchmark) analysis of what would have
happened in the absence of the change in public ownership. 
To identify the outcomes of nationalization from real
world examples, we need to look beyond individual cases to
answer the question as formulated by Sam Peltzman 40 years
ago; we wish to discover the following ‘… if a privately
owned firm is socialized, and nothing else happens, how will
the ownership alone affect the firm’s behaviour?’ (Peltzman,
1971). When we observe the outcomes of nationalized coal
mines in the United Kingdom we do not know how much of
the outcome to attribute to (i) the evolution of the coal
market, which is a function of global forces, as opposed to
(ii) developments elsewhere in the British economy,
including (iii) the labour movement, (iv) the efficiency of the
public sector, and of course, (v) the impact of nationalization. 
In addition to the two methodological problems discussed
above, a third difficulty is that certain firms are prone to be
nationalized while others are likely to be in the private sector
(Meggison and Netter, 2001). In industries where market
failure is serious and frequent, we have a prior expectation to
find public ownership of the firms (or single firms). So-called
natural monopolies are an example. This challenging problem
is not relevant in the case under consideration though, as the
mining sector in South Africa shows none of the features of a
natural monopoly. In fact, competition is robust not just
locally, but across international borders. 
The challenge of identifying the separate impact of
nationalization remains though and cannot be answered
through case studies. One approach to this problem is to
identify ‘natural experiments’, i.e. where history itself
controlled for all the other relevant factors except for the
issue under consideration. To make this less abstract,
consider the 35 publicly funded and 53 privately funded
expeditions to the Arctic between 1879 and 1909 studied by
Karpoff (2001). He was able to show that the differences in
outcomes were not due to different goals, technology, or
nationality. Instead, large differences in performance
(measured as the number of major scientific discoveries, the
absences of accidents or deaths, and the health of the partic-
ipants) were observed along the private-public division of
expeditions, with the private ones doing much better. What is
more, the public expeditions had the advantage of better
funding.
Since the transport sector has often been a target of
nationalization on public-goods grounds, it is instructive to
consider an industry-specific study of international airlines.
Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, and Lutter (1994)
investigated the consequences of state ownership for 
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**There is, for example a literature on relevant case studies often focusing
on experiences in the developed world, especially, in post-war Europe.
Economic histories of this kind are useful for understanding the
mechanics and some of the consequences of nationalization. More
recent nationalizations in Bolivia, Venezuela, and so on have also been
studied in this way.
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productivity growth and cost increases in 23 international
airlines. They found a productivity penalty of 1.5% to 2% per
year for state ownership.
While natural experiments are a powerful solution to the
challenge of identifying the counterfactual, such studies are
necessarily limited to very specific circumstances. More
general investigations are possible but in these cases we need
data sets with variation across institutions, time, and
countries or regions and this is where the nationalization
literature dries up. Fortunately, we can deduce some answers
from the much larger literature on the consequences of
privatization (Meggison and Netter, 2001, provide a thorough
review of the evidence). 
While one might object to the narrowness of the Ehrlich
et al. (1994) and Karpoff’s (2001) studies, these objections
fall away for the study of the 500 largest US firms by
Boardman and Vining (1989), the 500 largest non-financial
Canadian firms by Vining and Boardman (1992), and the 500
largest non-USA firms by Dewenter and Malatesta (2001).
While these papers do not all measure the same proxies of
efficiency, they all find that, after controlling for size, market
share, and other firm-specific features as well as
macroeconomic features that might impact on the selection of
ownership, the private firms are significantly more profitable
and, where measured, more productive than either mixed or
outright state-owned enterprises.
Do these results hold for developing countries, especially
those where the government is suspected of playing an active
and positive role in industrial policy as suggested by the
‘Developmental State’ theory? In short, yes. Chinese state-
owned and mixed enterprises are less productive than
comparable private firms, as found by Tian (2000), and the
same was found for Indian firms by Mujamdar (1996)  and
Chong and Lopez de Silanes (2005) for a cross-section in
Latin America. 
These results are consistent with the claim that national-
ization is more inefficient the more competitive the private
industry was prior to nationalization, but this claim was
studied explicitly by Kole and Mulherin (1997) using another
natural experiment. They studied the outcome of 17
American firms with substantial Japanese and German
ownership at the outset of World War II that were nation-
alized for security reasons by the US government. The US
government acted like a passive investor, leaving the goals
and management structures as before, partly because
government wanted to optimize the value of the firms with
an eye towards later re-privatization, which did occur. After
controlling for industry-specific features, Kole and Mulherin
(1997) showed that these temporarily nationalized firms
performed no differently on efficiency and profitability
measures than their private competitors. Not only did these
firms operate in competitive industries, but Kole and
Mulherin (1997) argued that they were left to compete like
private firms. The cost in terms of efficiency enters when the
nationalized firms starts to operate with different goals and
less competition than their private sector predecessors. 
An alternative to the empirical or historical and statistical
approaches described in the preceding paragraphs is to
examine the preconditions for successful nationalization to
determine whether a particular industry would be a suitable
candidate. The critical issue in an investigation of this kind is
to determine whether markets will function tolerably well in
the particular industry given the usual complement of market
regulations. 
Markets can fail when there are very large economies of
scale or large externalities, which are costs (or benefits)
associated with a particular activity, but not internalized in
the cost of that activity. Pollution is an example of a negative
externality. The possibility of market failure has motivated a
large expansion of the economic activity by government in
the course of the last century and in the immediate post-war
era public ownership of especially utilities was widely
implemented in the developed world, some of it via national-
ization. But enthusiasm for nationalization as a solution to
the risk of market failure has waned as (i) the reality of
government failure emerged and (ii) it became clear that
sufficient regulation can ameliorate many of the risks
associated with externalities (Tanzi, 2005). 
The stylized facts associated with recurrent waves of
nationalization mentioned above included the observation
that the resources sector has often been the target of nation-
alization. This is due to a specific form of the externalities
argument, often called Dutch Disease: i.e. the unintended
adverse impact on the industrial sector of a country where a
large commodity boom causes the real exchange rate to
appreciate, leaving the local industrial sector uncompetitive
internationally. But the relevance of this argument is
restricted to those few countries where the export basket is
dominated by a single or a small number of commodities and
where these cause massive current account surpluses that
risk appreciating the currency. South Africa is not among
those countries where the resources sector causes a massive
surplus on the current account, which risks local inflation or
nominal appreciation, both of which might cause real
appreciation and Dutch Disease. This potential externality is,
consequently, no case for nationalizing South African mines. 
Application to South Africa
The discovery of vast mineral deposits during the second half
of the nineteenth century changed the development path of
what would become the Republic of South Africa dramat-
ically. An economy based largely on agriculture and services
to international shipping was re-aligned to serve the rapidly
expanding mining sector in the interior, especially on the
Witwatersrand. Feinstein (2005) is just the latest economic
historian to identify especially the discovery of gold (and
diamonds to a lesser extent) as the critical moment in the
country’s economic history. The impact was so rapid and so
dramatic that within 25 years of the discovery at
Johannesburg, South Africa was amongst the small group of
countries that appeared to be converging on the group of
richest countries in the world (Dowrick and DeLong, 2005).  
A number of factors explain the critical role of gold in
South Africa’s economic history#. The sheer size of the
deposits and the value of the product extracted is the first
factor. By 1911 gold mining accounted for 20% of the GDP
and employed 224 000 miners. The impact of the sector went

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#The following paragraph summarizes the factors described more
thoroughly in Feinstein (2005, pp. 106–109)
much further, by stimulating capital markets, services
industries and especially manufacturing, such as machinery,
explosives and many others. Transport was needed to and
from the then-emerging industrial heartland around
Johannesburg and in this way the mines gave the first
motivation for the development of what would, in time,
become the continent’s best transport infrastructure. 
Mining was also of critical importance to government and
international finance in the decades after the discovery of the
gold and other minerals. Today the export of ore and
minerals accounts for around 25% of export earnings, but
this proportion was as high as 70% in the late 1930s. At the
same time, mining attracted massive direct foreign
investment, allowing the economy to build capital much
faster than would have been possible from domestic savings
alone. The market capitalization of the sector on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange remains high and much larger
in proportion to the total market capitalization of the stock
exchange than mining’s share in the real economy. 
Although the expansion of manufacturing and partic-
ularly the services sector has caused mining to decline in
relative importance for the South African economy, the sector
contributed a substantial 9.5% of gross value added in 2010.
While the sector’s output has grown only modestly since
1994, productivity has been rising at the same rate as in the
dominant financial sector (Du Plessis and Smit, 2009).
Privately owned mining companies operate in a competitive
environment and compete through higher productivity, as
one would expect from an industry where market forces work
tolerably well. Lately the sector has struggled in an uncertain
regulatory environment and with the risk of nationalization a
lingering reality (Financial Times, 2011). Indeed the
discouraging impact of the nationalization debate on
investment in the mining sector is a real cost that the
economy is already paying regardless of the debate’s
outcome (England, 2011). 
We turn now to the likely costs and benefits of nation-
alizing this important industry in South Africa.
Internationally, nationalization of mining companies occurs
typically when there is a clear financial benefit for the
particular government. This is more likely when one or a few
commodities account for a large part of economic activity and
the tax base. In Venezuela, for example, the state-run oil
company accounts for almost a half of government revenue
(Hults, 2007), and in 2005, Bolivian President Morales
nationalized the hydrocarbon industry (oil and gas), from
which the Bolivian government gets roughly a third of its
revenue, equal to 10% of the GDP (IMF, 2010).  
The comparable data for South Africa is tax revenue of
R17.9 billion from the mining sector in 2010, which was less
than 3% of government revenue and just 0.7% of the GDP
(National Treasury, 2011a). 
Since the South African debate remains speculative, there
is no clear indication of the valuation method that will be
used to determine the compensation paid to shareholders in
the event of nationalization. As argued above there is little
justification for the ANCYL’s claim that one possibility is to
nationalize the mines without compensation. In addition to
the legal restrictions domestically, there are also international
requirements for compensation in the form of foreign
investment treaties according to which government has
committed itself to full compensation in the event of
expropriation (Keeton and White, 2011). It follows that
government will have to compensate the current owners of
South African mines; and now it is time to see how much
government will pay and what it will get in return.  
Keeton and White (2011) offered the following
calculation: government buys a 60% stake in the local mining
companies at a cost of R970 billion. This would more than
double government outstanding debt, which was R820 billion
at the start of the 2011 fiscal year (National Treasury,
2011a). The higher debt stock would increase government’s
interest bill by R46.6 billion per year on the very optimistic
assumption that government can finance the extra debt at
existing capital market rates. As the current turmoil in
Europe has amply demonstrated, government is likely to pay
much more; an additional interest burden as low as R46.6
billion would therefore be an unlikely outcome 
However, government’s revenue would also rise after
nationalization, since the government would subsequently
claim 60% of the sector’s profits in addition to the taxes it
currently collects. In 2010 this would have added R20.9
billion to government’s revenue according to White and
Keeton’s (2011) calculation, assuming that government runs
the mines as efficiently as the private sector did. A project
that would cost government R46.6 billion extra per year to
gain R20.9 billion in revenue fails on the basic requirements
of financial management and will diminish the resources
government has available to pursue other goals.
Since the direct distributional impact of the resource
sector is limited, while that of the national budget is
extensive, it follows that nationalization will limit the scope
for a more equitable distribution of income within South
Africa.  And these calculations do not take into account the
considerable amounts in capital investment that government
would have to raise to maintain and expand the mine. As
Minister Manuel recently observed: ‘There are no fiscal
resources available through taxes or borrowing to pay for
mines or to invest in them, even if government were to get
these mines gratis’ (quoted in England, 2011, p. 4). 
A second method to calculate the financial viability of
nationalizing the mines is to see whether they are profitable
enough to yield a positive return on investment by the
government. This calculation was done for three large gold
mining groups for this paper: AngloGold Ashanti, Gold
Fields, and Harmony. Taking the revenue generated by the
South African mines only in these groups and comparing it to
the share of their market capitalization attributable to their
South African operations, one can calculate the yield that
government would get by nationalizing these mines at
market prices. It is important to disentangle the revenues for
these multinational companies, as the cost-effectiveness can
vary dramatically in their portfolios, and at least for the gold
mines the South African operations are typically expensive to
operate on an international comparison. 
In 2010 Gold Fields yielded 7% relative to market capital-
ization on local operations, while Harmony reported a net
loss and Anglogold Ashanti a yield of 1%. Comparing these
yields to the cost of government debt at around 8% and
making the same optimistic assumption that this cost of
finance does not rise with the dramatic rise in government
debt, it is clear that nationalization is financially unjustifiable
even under very optimistic assumptions. 
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Summary
The arguments in this paper can be summarized in the
following points: 
 First, the resources sector in South Africa is not subject
to notable market failures nor does it pose the risk of
Dutch Disease. The resources sector is competitive and
therefore a poor candidate for public ownership. The
international evidence suggests overwhelmingly that
the nationalized firms would be less efficient in these
circumstances. Nationalized mines would have
confused goals, worse monitoring, and worse feedback
compared with existing mines
 Second, nationalizing the resources sector will cost
government more than it receives. This is not only a
bad idea in itself, but it will limit the scope for
distributive policies on the national budget 
 Third, as a corollary of the annual fiscal burden, the
project would raise government debt dramatically at a
time when our debt is forecast to rise sharply for other
reasons, and the international experience demonstrates
the risks associated with this path. 
The cost to the economy will not only be measured in the
mining sector and in government finances: higher capital
market interest rates will curtail investment across the board,
lowering economic growth and curtailing employment
growth. The balance of payments will come under more strain
as international investment is discouraged. Finally, nation-
alizing the resources sector will undermine support for those
very market-based institutions we need in order to achieve a
higher long-run growth trajectory. 
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